Back in the day, there was scarcity. I watched NBC's "Game of the Week" because I got to see teams other than the one that played in my home city. And, as for the team in my home city, no home games were televised, and not all road games were either. We listened to many games on a transistor radio.
We appreciated those games the same way we appreciated the telecasts of the "ECAC Game of the Week" for college basketball. In my city, a UHF station would televise college games of the schools in the area, dramatically so. It was the ECAC Game of the Week, the local games, an occasional national telecast, what was on ABC's "Wide World of Sports" -- and nothing more. We appreciated what we saw because there was no internet, there was little if any cable television.
Today, you can get almost anything on your phone -- through subscriptions, yes, but still on your phone, on your pad, on your PC. And when I saw anything it could be a game from the Big Sky Conference at 11 pm eastern time on a Thursday night. It's hard to appreciate much of anything when the airwaves overwhelm you with everything.
My particular bone to pick is with hockey and basketball, where so many teams make the playoffs as to render the regular season all but meaningless. I mean, why play 82 games in basketball and 80 in hockey if half the teams in the league make the playoffs. What is the point of the regular season if there is no crowned regular-season champion and if all that matters is the post-season playoff system? With respect to the NBA, so unimportant is the regular season that teams regularly rest key players later in the season, when playoff seedings all but have been determined. And that is just awful.
People pay very good money for NBA tickets. After getting years of data, the NBA teams have priced their tickets in such a way that season ticket holders pay top dollar and then suffer when they try to sell tickets for almost any game on the secondary market. I have experienced this myself with my town's team. A top team came through the other night, and the secondary market's prices were one half of what I paid for my tickets. And if a star sat out, well, that's insult to injury. After all, you are paying top prices to see the best play.
Except the way the NBA is set up, if it's all about winning the title for an elite team, it has no incentive to play key players in meaningless games. And it's hard to argue that among 82 games, some are not meaningless, especially if it's the fifth game in eight days on a road trip. The players get exhausted -- from the travel and from the exertion. Hard to blame the players for not wanting to get injured and the teams for not setting themselves up for deep playoff runs.
But it's also hard not to blame the fans for getting really frustrated. Let's face it, many games are just entertainment because the teams know that either they are saving themselves for the playoffs or because they have no chance of making the playoffs and are playing to create good film for individual players on the trade market or to get a better chance at a top draft pick (which means they are fielding lineups that cannot beat even average teams). The NBA thinks it has a good thing, but good league evolve just when they think that they have solved their biggest problems.
My solution: shorten the season, adopt some one-and-done "cup" tournaments among teams with trophies that over the years will matter, and have fewer teams make the playoffs. Take some pages out of the international soccer playbook, but give all teams more to play for. And consider moving franchises and compelling ownership to sell if a team finishes in the bottom 10% say three times in a five-year period. No one wants to pay good money for a franchise that is poorly managed.
Make the games mean something again. Enough of the hip public address announcers, dancers, gimmicks between quarters, flashing lights, big scoreboards. Give us good games, games with meaning.
Friday, December 13, 2019
Tuesday, December 10, 2019
Making Way for the Next Generation -- of Players, Leaders, and Even Owners
We see people age quickly in sports. Coaches get sentimental, so do teammates, do does the media, and so do fans. It is sad to see aging stars fail to keep up, fail to make the runs they need to, fail to do the things that made them stars in the first place.
What also is hard is that when players have seniority, they set all sorts of examples for the younger players as to conduct. Some of those examples are bad. For example, a leader gets into the clubhouse early, leaves late, and talks with the younger players about how to sleep, how to eat, how to take care of their bodies so that they can have long and productive careers. An aging star who is not a leader expects his own set of rules, and while he might play hard, he does nothing to elevate the team. In fact, some of these leaders, who insist upon deference because they have been there and done that, do the opposite. And then there are those veterans whose experience gets them deference whether they seek that deference or not. Put differently, those veterans can set the tone and the mood for the team. That can mean that a laid back veteran's approach to the game blocks the energy that a younger group of stars ready to take over might want to display.
My crucible for this particular theory is Arsenal FC, which discovered something very interesting yesterday when it removed David Luiz from the lineup. There is no doubt that Luiz commands respect -- he was an instrumental figure on the Brazilian national team (which while not successful according to Brazilian standards in recent World Cups is still a very difficult team to make and start for) and Chelsea (which did win titles while he was there). But the 32 year-old Luiz is far from the player he was five years ago. Chelsea fans were happy when he left for Arsenal; their view was that he was well past his prime and because his skills had eroded, he would take chances that created goal-scoring opportunities for opponents, and too many of them at that. Some of those gambles cost Chelsea games.
Yet so desperate did Arsenal believe itself to be that it purchased Luiz from Chelsea and anointed him a starting center back. His personality is such that it can be dominating -- you can see that on the field. The problem is that Arsenal had gambled with aging and/or underskilled center backs -- Laurent Koscielny (aging and frequently injured), Shkodran Mustafi (underskilled for the EPL), and Sokratis (perhaps not performing as the skills he demonstrated at Dortmund predicted he would for Arsenal. Then there were younger defenders -- Mavropanous (injured and developing), Rob Holding (missed last season according to injury) and Callum Chambers (perhaps just not good enough). So, they added Luiz.
The problem is that he has not performed nearly well enough to suggest that the club is better off with him. Yet, he started almost every match for the Gunners, except for yesterday. And free of his opinions and actions, the Gunners played a more low-key duo at center half and then opened the club up for younger players -- Kieran Tierney (went off because of an injury), Ainsley Maitland-Niles (best match in months), Lucas Torreira (who finally showed what we all had expected of him when he joined the club from Sampdoria two years ago) and, of course, Gabriel Martinelli, a generational attacker in the words of that great developer of talent, Juergen Klopp. What result was an Arsenal that threw its cares to the wind, was not paralyzed at the back, relaxed in the second half and put on a show against, admittedly, a struggling West Ham team. That said, any football manager will tell you that three points for a win is three points, and you take them regardless of how well your opponent is playing at the time.
I don't want to put all of Arsenal's problems on Luiz. I think that 65% of the issue is with management. The good news is that they parted company with Ivan Gazidis; the bad news was that they lost outstanding talent scout Sven Mislintat in a power struggle with Raul Sanellhi, a former Nike executive who did a stint at Barcelona, but who seems more like an influencer/operator than a real football guy. The other bad news is that they still have Stan Kroenke as their owner, and his track record says that he owns without passion or commitment to using personal funds to take a team to an elite level. That has not cut it in North London, and it is time for the Kroenkes to make that commitment or sell the team to someone who really cares about winning. To crystallize the problem -- Daniel Levy, Tottenham's chair, has out-"ownered" Stan Kroenke markedly in the past five years and has made gutsy decisions that have made Spurs an elite team, in contrast to Kroenke's actions, which have made Arsenal a complicated puzzle wrapped inside a riddle.
On the pitch, the good news is that the team started to do yesterday what everyone thought it would do when all players got healthy -- turn it loose on offense and make themselves difficult to defend and to challenge. That said, the team still has needs at center back and center defensive midfielder, needs that former manager Unai Emery wanted to fill but met with rebuffs from management, and my guess is was Sanellhi speaking for Kroenke. On the pitch, the club is turning to its very talented younger players to help forge a path forward and build some belief.
Off the pitch, though, is where to watch if you are an Arsenal fan or observer. Will Stan Kroenke be a dilettante, or will he be a passionate football fan? Arsenal, its former players, and its fans deserve a lot more than they are getting at the moment for this jewel of a club.
They are capable of and need to find a manager who is not inexpensive but who can develop players and make key acquisitions -- someone like "the next Juergen Klopp." Some of the names bandied about -- Sousa, Marcelino, are not top-tier managers and have had enough experience to suggest that they never will be. There will be much eloquence in who the next hire is. The more you hear Arteta, Pochettino, Nagelsmann, the more you hear smart football people talking. The more you hear Marcelino and Sousa, the more you hear puppetmasters talking through enablers. It's that simple.
And they need to become an ownership that has a passion for winning, not just for owning. If the Kroenkes cannot muster that level of commitment, they should do the honorable thing and sell the club to someone with much more of a deep-seated caring about Arsenal as a way of life, and not just as investment.
What also is hard is that when players have seniority, they set all sorts of examples for the younger players as to conduct. Some of those examples are bad. For example, a leader gets into the clubhouse early, leaves late, and talks with the younger players about how to sleep, how to eat, how to take care of their bodies so that they can have long and productive careers. An aging star who is not a leader expects his own set of rules, and while he might play hard, he does nothing to elevate the team. In fact, some of these leaders, who insist upon deference because they have been there and done that, do the opposite. And then there are those veterans whose experience gets them deference whether they seek that deference or not. Put differently, those veterans can set the tone and the mood for the team. That can mean that a laid back veteran's approach to the game blocks the energy that a younger group of stars ready to take over might want to display.
My crucible for this particular theory is Arsenal FC, which discovered something very interesting yesterday when it removed David Luiz from the lineup. There is no doubt that Luiz commands respect -- he was an instrumental figure on the Brazilian national team (which while not successful according to Brazilian standards in recent World Cups is still a very difficult team to make and start for) and Chelsea (which did win titles while he was there). But the 32 year-old Luiz is far from the player he was five years ago. Chelsea fans were happy when he left for Arsenal; their view was that he was well past his prime and because his skills had eroded, he would take chances that created goal-scoring opportunities for opponents, and too many of them at that. Some of those gambles cost Chelsea games.
Yet so desperate did Arsenal believe itself to be that it purchased Luiz from Chelsea and anointed him a starting center back. His personality is such that it can be dominating -- you can see that on the field. The problem is that Arsenal had gambled with aging and/or underskilled center backs -- Laurent Koscielny (aging and frequently injured), Shkodran Mustafi (underskilled for the EPL), and Sokratis (perhaps not performing as the skills he demonstrated at Dortmund predicted he would for Arsenal. Then there were younger defenders -- Mavropanous (injured and developing), Rob Holding (missed last season according to injury) and Callum Chambers (perhaps just not good enough). So, they added Luiz.
The problem is that he has not performed nearly well enough to suggest that the club is better off with him. Yet, he started almost every match for the Gunners, except for yesterday. And free of his opinions and actions, the Gunners played a more low-key duo at center half and then opened the club up for younger players -- Kieran Tierney (went off because of an injury), Ainsley Maitland-Niles (best match in months), Lucas Torreira (who finally showed what we all had expected of him when he joined the club from Sampdoria two years ago) and, of course, Gabriel Martinelli, a generational attacker in the words of that great developer of talent, Juergen Klopp. What result was an Arsenal that threw its cares to the wind, was not paralyzed at the back, relaxed in the second half and put on a show against, admittedly, a struggling West Ham team. That said, any football manager will tell you that three points for a win is three points, and you take them regardless of how well your opponent is playing at the time.
I don't want to put all of Arsenal's problems on Luiz. I think that 65% of the issue is with management. The good news is that they parted company with Ivan Gazidis; the bad news was that they lost outstanding talent scout Sven Mislintat in a power struggle with Raul Sanellhi, a former Nike executive who did a stint at Barcelona, but who seems more like an influencer/operator than a real football guy. The other bad news is that they still have Stan Kroenke as their owner, and his track record says that he owns without passion or commitment to using personal funds to take a team to an elite level. That has not cut it in North London, and it is time for the Kroenkes to make that commitment or sell the team to someone who really cares about winning. To crystallize the problem -- Daniel Levy, Tottenham's chair, has out-"ownered" Stan Kroenke markedly in the past five years and has made gutsy decisions that have made Spurs an elite team, in contrast to Kroenke's actions, which have made Arsenal a complicated puzzle wrapped inside a riddle.
On the pitch, the good news is that the team started to do yesterday what everyone thought it would do when all players got healthy -- turn it loose on offense and make themselves difficult to defend and to challenge. That said, the team still has needs at center back and center defensive midfielder, needs that former manager Unai Emery wanted to fill but met with rebuffs from management, and my guess is was Sanellhi speaking for Kroenke. On the pitch, the club is turning to its very talented younger players to help forge a path forward and build some belief.
Off the pitch, though, is where to watch if you are an Arsenal fan or observer. Will Stan Kroenke be a dilettante, or will he be a passionate football fan? Arsenal, its former players, and its fans deserve a lot more than they are getting at the moment for this jewel of a club.
They are capable of and need to find a manager who is not inexpensive but who can develop players and make key acquisitions -- someone like "the next Juergen Klopp." Some of the names bandied about -- Sousa, Marcelino, are not top-tier managers and have had enough experience to suggest that they never will be. There will be much eloquence in who the next hire is. The more you hear Arteta, Pochettino, Nagelsmann, the more you hear smart football people talking. The more you hear Marcelino and Sousa, the more you hear puppetmasters talking through enablers. It's that simple.
And they need to become an ownership that has a passion for winning, not just for owning. If the Kroenkes cannot muster that level of commitment, they should do the honorable thing and sell the club to someone with much more of a deep-seated caring about Arsenal as a way of life, and not just as investment.
Monday, December 09, 2019
Lou Whitaker Should Be Very Annoyed
So whatever they call the Veterans Committee for Baseball's Hall of Fame met over the weekend. They announced that they had voted two people into the Hall of Fame -- Marvin Miller, who led the players' union into becoming the most powerful and feared union in the history of organized labor, and Ted Simmons, a good hitting catcher who spent his career with the Cardinals and Brewers.
What is much more noticeable is who they left out -- Lou Whitaker, who, along with Alan Trammell (who is in the Hall), formed the longest-standing double-play combination in Major League history.
A player needed 12 votes to get into the Hall. Dwight Evans, who played right field for the Red Sox on teams with Hall of Famer Jim Rice, got eight votes. Dave Parker, who played right field for the Pirates and Reds, got seven votes, and Steve Garvey, the first baseman on some very good Dodger teams in the 1970's and early 1980's, got six votes. As did Whitaker.
I am not going to tear down the players who got as many as or more votes than Whitaker. All were fine players in their own right; I am not sure that any of them belongs in the Hall of Fame, though. Then again, given who is in the Hall of Fame, good arguments can be made for each of them. (At one point in history, the Veterans Committee was so populated with former players that they decided to vote in their teammates -- including many Cardinals and Giants, some of whom, by today's standards, are not Hall-worthy).
Wins Above Replacement Player is a measure that many use to determine who the best players are and were and who belongs in the Hall and who does not. Here is the WAR for Simmons and the others above:
Lou Whitaker -- 75.1
Dwight Evans -- 67.2
Ted Simmons -- 50.3
Dave Parker -- 40.1
Steve Garvey -- 38.1.
Whitaker is in rarified air -- his career WAR is higher than those for Luke Appling, Reggie Jackson, Frank Thomas, Jim Thome, Arky Vaughan, Paul Waner, Derek Jeter, Harry Heilmann, Johnny Mize, Trammell, Ron Santo, Frankie Frisch, Barry Larkin, Gary Carter, Tony Gwynn, Al Simmons, Eddie Murray, Pudge Rodriguez, Carlton Fisk, Edgar Martinez, Ryne Sandberg, Fred Clarke, Ernie Banks, Roberto Alomar, Joe Cronin, Duke Snider, Pee Wee Reese, Goose Goslin, Craig Biggio, Andre Dawson, Willie McCovey, Dave Winfield, Richie Ashburn, Billy Williams, Lou Boudreau, Home Run Baker, Harmon Killebrew, Zach Wheat, Yogi Berra, Mike Piazza, Vladimir Guerrero, Bill Dickey, Hank Greenberg, Willie Stargell, Luis Aparicio, Willie Keeler, Bill Terry, Tony Perez, George Sisler, Joe Tinker, Orlando Cepeda, Ralph Kiner, Nellie Fox, Mickey Cochrane, Johnny Evers, Jim Rice. . . and, well, you get the point.
So, what were the following people thinking -- George Brett, Rod Carew, Dennis Eckersley, Eddie Murray, Ozzie Smith, Robin Yount, Sandy Alderson, Dave Dombrowski, David Glass, Walt Jocketty, Doug Melvin, Terry Ryanb, Bill Center, Steve Hirdt, Jack O'Connell and Tracy Ringolsby? These are the members of the Modern Era Committee. What was so awful about Whitaker's body of work and so wonderful about the work of Simmons that he gets elected and Whitaker does not? And, likewise, why did Evans and Parker get more votes than Whitaker and Garvey the same amount?
I watched all of the above-named players play, as well as Tommy John, Don Mattingly and Dale Murphy, each of whom was eligible for votes. All were very good players. But in a sport where the numbers supposedly do not lie and the metrics matter, it is hard to ignore the difference between Whitaker's WAR and everyone else's.
The question is -- the others might have had strong advocates for their election. Who was advocating for Lou Whitaker?
And should it matter.
What is much more noticeable is who they left out -- Lou Whitaker, who, along with Alan Trammell (who is in the Hall), formed the longest-standing double-play combination in Major League history.
A player needed 12 votes to get into the Hall. Dwight Evans, who played right field for the Red Sox on teams with Hall of Famer Jim Rice, got eight votes. Dave Parker, who played right field for the Pirates and Reds, got seven votes, and Steve Garvey, the first baseman on some very good Dodger teams in the 1970's and early 1980's, got six votes. As did Whitaker.
I am not going to tear down the players who got as many as or more votes than Whitaker. All were fine players in their own right; I am not sure that any of them belongs in the Hall of Fame, though. Then again, given who is in the Hall of Fame, good arguments can be made for each of them. (At one point in history, the Veterans Committee was so populated with former players that they decided to vote in their teammates -- including many Cardinals and Giants, some of whom, by today's standards, are not Hall-worthy).
Wins Above Replacement Player is a measure that many use to determine who the best players are and were and who belongs in the Hall and who does not. Here is the WAR for Simmons and the others above:
Lou Whitaker -- 75.1
Dwight Evans -- 67.2
Ted Simmons -- 50.3
Dave Parker -- 40.1
Steve Garvey -- 38.1.
Whitaker is in rarified air -- his career WAR is higher than those for Luke Appling, Reggie Jackson, Frank Thomas, Jim Thome, Arky Vaughan, Paul Waner, Derek Jeter, Harry Heilmann, Johnny Mize, Trammell, Ron Santo, Frankie Frisch, Barry Larkin, Gary Carter, Tony Gwynn, Al Simmons, Eddie Murray, Pudge Rodriguez, Carlton Fisk, Edgar Martinez, Ryne Sandberg, Fred Clarke, Ernie Banks, Roberto Alomar, Joe Cronin, Duke Snider, Pee Wee Reese, Goose Goslin, Craig Biggio, Andre Dawson, Willie McCovey, Dave Winfield, Richie Ashburn, Billy Williams, Lou Boudreau, Home Run Baker, Harmon Killebrew, Zach Wheat, Yogi Berra, Mike Piazza, Vladimir Guerrero, Bill Dickey, Hank Greenberg, Willie Stargell, Luis Aparicio, Willie Keeler, Bill Terry, Tony Perez, George Sisler, Joe Tinker, Orlando Cepeda, Ralph Kiner, Nellie Fox, Mickey Cochrane, Johnny Evers, Jim Rice. . . and, well, you get the point.
So, what were the following people thinking -- George Brett, Rod Carew, Dennis Eckersley, Eddie Murray, Ozzie Smith, Robin Yount, Sandy Alderson, Dave Dombrowski, David Glass, Walt Jocketty, Doug Melvin, Terry Ryanb, Bill Center, Steve Hirdt, Jack O'Connell and Tracy Ringolsby? These are the members of the Modern Era Committee. What was so awful about Whitaker's body of work and so wonderful about the work of Simmons that he gets elected and Whitaker does not? And, likewise, why did Evans and Parker get more votes than Whitaker and Garvey the same amount?
I watched all of the above-named players play, as well as Tommy John, Don Mattingly and Dale Murphy, each of whom was eligible for votes. All were very good players. But in a sport where the numbers supposedly do not lie and the metrics matter, it is hard to ignore the difference between Whitaker's WAR and everyone else's.
The question is -- the others might have had strong advocates for their election. Who was advocating for Lou Whitaker?
And should it matter.
Tuesday, December 03, 2019
Sentimentality and NFL Rosters
There is a saying in business that if you are at the front of the back, you will end up face down riddled with bullets and that if you are at the back of the pack, the cheetah will pick you off and devour you. Better to be in the middle of the pack and be a fast follower of what works.
Evidence seems to suggest that this is the case, that no coach or general manager seeks to innovate markedly because their tenures can be so short and the patience of ownership and fans so fickle and brittle that to dare greatly is to end up out of a job. So most general managers and coaches seem to trend toward the average of what everyone else does. What they expect that is that out of this behavior they will transcend and excel, when, in fact, they probably will not after several years.
What fascinates is that teams do not follow the principles that the New England Patriots do. Talk about establishing a dynasty, and talk about doing it with some stars, a generational quarterback (and there are others out there who could have done the job very well if not as good as Tom Brady over as long a period of time) and many interchangeable parts. It's not as though the Hall of Fame will be overrun with Patriots' players, although many will be worthy because of their outstanding contributions to a dynasty. No, what has worked for the Patriots has been the opposite of wanting to see iconic players play out their careers in Foxboro. Instead, the Patriots let good players go. And they have done it all the time.
The Patriots do not stand pat. They win a Super Bowl and then some good players who become free agents get lucrative deals with other teams. Some players play well, others struggle.. Now it could be that they were good players on a very good team who could not become great players on an average to below-average team. It also could be that they were average players on a very good team who got the most out of their abilities on the dynasty because the coaching staff coached them within their limitations and did not ask them to do what their new teams had to ask them. Whatever the case, Bill Belichick in a way is to the NFL what Schroeder is to Lucy Van Pelt of "Peanuts." Destroy his bust of Beethoven, and he goes to his closet, has an inventory full of them, and pulls out yet another one. In NFL terms, that means if a player falters or cannot perform at a level New England deems necessary, they go into their box of tricks, their list of players who might be available, and they solve their problems in a different way.
Contrast Belichick to Howie Rosemann, Doug Pederson and the Philadelphia Eagles. The Birds won a Super Bowl in 2017-18 thanks to some good leadership. some great play from a young quarterback, the maturity of an offensive line and the fact that they had a backup QB who was ready to shine when the lights shone brightest. The fans were elated, but then everyone -- the team, the media, the players, the fans -- started talking about a "new norm" and how they were going to win more titles.
The fact of the matter is that no one in the organization was ruthless enough to do so. The coaches got complacent, the veterans got complacent, and the front office got complacent. They started to believe too much that they deserved to be where they were and got drunk on the Super Bowl to such a degree that the hangover prevented them from thinking clearly. Jason Peters, who will have a place in Canton, was done perhaps before the big game. He should have been released after the season. Jason Kelce had flirted with retirement after last season -- so much so that you wonder if he had anything left -- and this season has shown that he doesn't have much left. And so forth.
The average age of a player in the NFL is not that old, and players age quickly. Tread on the tires not only means a decreasing physical ability to get the job done, but at times a decreasing emotional wherewithal to do what is necessary to get the job done. And just because someone was on the roster to help you win a Super Bowl does not mean you have to keep them around. For every Matthew Slater there are dozens of guys who for one reason or another cannot contribute at a level to keep the team playing at a high level. The Patriots know this better than everyone else and have enough confidence in their coaching and system to keep the team young and strong and hungry enough. Strangely, it seems that few others, if any, have figured this out.
So the Eagles keep on saying that their 5-7 record does not represent who and what they are. The fans are angry because they are "losing games that they should not be losing." But the question that should be asked is whether this is true? Perhaps they should be losing these games because the talent is not there, the coaching is not there, and the front office has mis-judged who should remain on the team. It is hard to keep players forever, and the key is not to keep them for too long.
When the Eagles went into this season, there was a lot of hype that a healthy squad could return to the Super Bowl. The team believed it, and the press and the fans bought into it. But something smelled from the beginning. The team got older. Did anyone really believe that a 38-year old Jason Peters could play at a Hall of Fame level and could play for more than 10 games? Did anyone really believe that DeSean Jackson would play a full season after not having played 16 games in a season for years? Did anyone believe that the team would get out of the starting gate strongly with so many players not playing a down in pre-season. Finally, did anyone believe that one of the oldest teams in the league would stay healthy enough to win a Super Bowl?
Put simply, the strategy of the team going into the season was bad. They made some big, bold assumptions and let sentimentality get in the way of practicality. By doing so, they chose the easier wrong over the harder right. Yes, the team would have risked some blowback from the fans from cutting loose some key contributors to the Super Bowl.
But I'd bet that their record would be better than 5-7 right now.
Evidence seems to suggest that this is the case, that no coach or general manager seeks to innovate markedly because their tenures can be so short and the patience of ownership and fans so fickle and brittle that to dare greatly is to end up out of a job. So most general managers and coaches seem to trend toward the average of what everyone else does. What they expect that is that out of this behavior they will transcend and excel, when, in fact, they probably will not after several years.
What fascinates is that teams do not follow the principles that the New England Patriots do. Talk about establishing a dynasty, and talk about doing it with some stars, a generational quarterback (and there are others out there who could have done the job very well if not as good as Tom Brady over as long a period of time) and many interchangeable parts. It's not as though the Hall of Fame will be overrun with Patriots' players, although many will be worthy because of their outstanding contributions to a dynasty. No, what has worked for the Patriots has been the opposite of wanting to see iconic players play out their careers in Foxboro. Instead, the Patriots let good players go. And they have done it all the time.
The Patriots do not stand pat. They win a Super Bowl and then some good players who become free agents get lucrative deals with other teams. Some players play well, others struggle.. Now it could be that they were good players on a very good team who could not become great players on an average to below-average team. It also could be that they were average players on a very good team who got the most out of their abilities on the dynasty because the coaching staff coached them within their limitations and did not ask them to do what their new teams had to ask them. Whatever the case, Bill Belichick in a way is to the NFL what Schroeder is to Lucy Van Pelt of "Peanuts." Destroy his bust of Beethoven, and he goes to his closet, has an inventory full of them, and pulls out yet another one. In NFL terms, that means if a player falters or cannot perform at a level New England deems necessary, they go into their box of tricks, their list of players who might be available, and they solve their problems in a different way.
Contrast Belichick to Howie Rosemann, Doug Pederson and the Philadelphia Eagles. The Birds won a Super Bowl in 2017-18 thanks to some good leadership. some great play from a young quarterback, the maturity of an offensive line and the fact that they had a backup QB who was ready to shine when the lights shone brightest. The fans were elated, but then everyone -- the team, the media, the players, the fans -- started talking about a "new norm" and how they were going to win more titles.
The fact of the matter is that no one in the organization was ruthless enough to do so. The coaches got complacent, the veterans got complacent, and the front office got complacent. They started to believe too much that they deserved to be where they were and got drunk on the Super Bowl to such a degree that the hangover prevented them from thinking clearly. Jason Peters, who will have a place in Canton, was done perhaps before the big game. He should have been released after the season. Jason Kelce had flirted with retirement after last season -- so much so that you wonder if he had anything left -- and this season has shown that he doesn't have much left. And so forth.
The average age of a player in the NFL is not that old, and players age quickly. Tread on the tires not only means a decreasing physical ability to get the job done, but at times a decreasing emotional wherewithal to do what is necessary to get the job done. And just because someone was on the roster to help you win a Super Bowl does not mean you have to keep them around. For every Matthew Slater there are dozens of guys who for one reason or another cannot contribute at a level to keep the team playing at a high level. The Patriots know this better than everyone else and have enough confidence in their coaching and system to keep the team young and strong and hungry enough. Strangely, it seems that few others, if any, have figured this out.
So the Eagles keep on saying that their 5-7 record does not represent who and what they are. The fans are angry because they are "losing games that they should not be losing." But the question that should be asked is whether this is true? Perhaps they should be losing these games because the talent is not there, the coaching is not there, and the front office has mis-judged who should remain on the team. It is hard to keep players forever, and the key is not to keep them for too long.
When the Eagles went into this season, there was a lot of hype that a healthy squad could return to the Super Bowl. The team believed it, and the press and the fans bought into it. But something smelled from the beginning. The team got older. Did anyone really believe that a 38-year old Jason Peters could play at a Hall of Fame level and could play for more than 10 games? Did anyone really believe that DeSean Jackson would play a full season after not having played 16 games in a season for years? Did anyone believe that the team would get out of the starting gate strongly with so many players not playing a down in pre-season. Finally, did anyone believe that one of the oldest teams in the league would stay healthy enough to win a Super Bowl?
Put simply, the strategy of the team going into the season was bad. They made some big, bold assumptions and let sentimentality get in the way of practicality. By doing so, they chose the easier wrong over the harder right. Yes, the team would have risked some blowback from the fans from cutting loose some key contributors to the Super Bowl.
But I'd bet that their record would be better than 5-7 right now.
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